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Difference between revisions of "John Paul Stevens (US Supreme Court Justice) on software patents"

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'''John Paul Stevens''', or '''Justice Stevens''', is a judge on the [[US Supreme Court]].
 
 
 
Justice Stevens is the only member of the court involve in previous cases which touched on [[patentable subject matter]]. Stevens wrote the majority opinion in [[Parker v. Flook (1978, USA)]], and wrote a dissenting opinion in [[Diamond v. Diehr (1981, USA)]].
 
 
 
==Official statements==
 
 
 
Below are excerpts from his contributions in opinions and hearings.
 
 
 
===The [[Bilski v. Kappos (2009, USA)|Bilski]] hearing===
 
 
 
:''(see: [http://news.swpat.org/2009/11/bilski-hearing-transcript/ The Bilski hearing transcript, as text])''
 
 
 
During the Bilski hearing, Stevens sounded very critical of Bilski's patent, and it sounded like his reasoning might apply to most software patents too.
 
 
 
Replying to Bilksi's lawyer's defence of their patent, Stevens said:
 
 
 
<blockquote>
 
''But is it correct that there’s none — none of our cases have ever approved a rule such as you advocate?''
 
</blockquote>
 
 
 
and:
 
 
 
<blockquote>
 
''I don’t understand how that can be a patent on a machine if the only thing novel is the process that the machine is using. Isn’t — isn’t the question — really, the question there was whether the new process was patentable.''
 
</blockquote>
 
 
 
and:
 
 
 
<blockquote>
 
''I don’t understand why that isn’t just the application of a process, which – which is not itself patentable subject matter, to a particular machine that can use process''
 
</blockquote>
 
 
 
and finally:
 
 
 
<blockquote>
 
''It’s not on a computer, which the only difference from the old computer is it’s using a new program. You can’t say that’s a new machine.''
 
</blockquote>
 
 
 
Note: in [[USA#Legislation|US patent legislation]], "processes" and "machines" are patentable, so defenders of software patents always have to argue that their invention is one of these.
 
 
 
===Microsoft v. AT&T, 2006===
 
 
 
:''(See [[Microsoft v. AT&T (2006, USA)]])''
 
 
 
Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in this case.<ref>http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1056.pdf</ref>  Some argue that the following text indicates that he might now consider software functionality as patentable.
 
 
 
<blockquote>
 
''I disagree with the Court’s suggestion that because software is analogous to an abstract set of instructions, it cannot be regarded as a “component” within the meaning of §271(f). See ante, at 9–10. Whether attached or detached from any medium, software plainly satisfies the dictionary definition of that word. See ante, at 9, n. 11 (observing that “‘[c]omponent’ is commonly defined as ‘a constituent part,’ ‘element,’ or ‘ingredient’”). And unlike a blueprint that merely instructs a user how to do something, software actually causes infringing conduct to occur.  It is more like a roller that causes a player piano to produce sound than sheet music that tells a pianist what to do. Moreover, it is surely not “a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use” as that term is used in §271(f)(2). On the contrary, its sole intended use is an infringing use.
 
</blockquote>
 
 
 
===Diamond v. Diehr, 1981===
 
 
 
:''(See [[Diamond v. Diehr (1981, USA)]])''
 
 
 
Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in Diamond v. Diehr, joined by three others, calling for an:
 
 
 
<blockquote>
 
''an unequivocal holding that no program-related invention is a patentable process under § 101 unless it makes a contribution to the art that is not dependent entirely on the utilization of a computer.''
 
</blockquote>
 
 
 
"§101" is the section of [[US legislation]] that defines [[patentable subject matter]].
 
 
 
===Parker v. Flook, 1978===
 
 
 
:''(See [[Parker v. Flook (1978, USA)]])''
 
 
 
Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Parker v. Flook, stating that not all forms of "post-solution activity" are sufficient to turn an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.
 
 
 
==External links==
 
 
 
* [http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/11/12/exploring-justice-stevens-patent-past-for-clues/ Exploring Justice Steven’s Patent Past for Clues], Nov 12<sup>th</sup> 2009, IP-Watchdog (pro-swpat)
 
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Paul_Stevens Wikipedia: John Paul Stevens]
 
 
 
==References==
 
<references />
 
 
 
 
 
{{footer}}
 
{{DEFAULTSORT:Stevens, John Paul}}
 
[[Category:People]]
 

Revision as of 05:18, 26 June 2010

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