Difference between revisions of "John Paul Stevens (US Supreme Court Justice) on software patents"
(→The Bilski hearing: <blockquote> ''It’s not on a computer, which the only difference from the old computer is it’s using a new program. You can’t say that’s a new machine.'' </blockquote>) |
(→Microsoft v. AT&T (2006, USA): Some argue that the following text indicates that he might now consider software functionality as patentable.) |
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− | Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in this case.<ref>http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1056.pdf</ref> | + | Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in this case.<ref>http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1056.pdf</ref> Some argue that the following text indicates that he might now consider software functionality as patentable. |
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Revision as of 08:31, 18 April 2010
John Paul Stevens, or Justice Stevens, is a judge on the US Supreme Court.
Contents
Official statements
Below are excerpts from his contributions in opinions and hearings.
The Bilski hearing
Replying to Bilksi's lawyer's defence of their patent, Stevens said:
But is it correct that there’s none — none of our cases have ever approved a rule such as you advocate?
And his general comments, which are critical of Bilski's patent, seems based on criteria that would also exclude software functionality claims:
I don’t understand how that can be a patent on a machine if the only thing novel is the process that the machine is using. Isn’t — isn’t the question — really, the question there was whether the new process was patentable.
and:
I don’t understand why that isn’t just the application of a process, which – which is not itself patentable subject matter, to a particular machine that can use process
It’s not on a computer, which the only difference from the old computer is it’s using a new program. You can’t say that’s a new machine.
Microsoft v. AT&T (2006, USA)
Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in this case.[1] Some argue that the following text indicates that he might now consider software functionality as patentable.
I disagree with the Court’s suggestion that because software is analogous to an abstract set of instructions, itcannot be regarded as a “component” within the meaning of §271(f). See ante, at 9–10. Whether attached or de-tached from any medium, software plainly satisfies the dictionary definition of that word. See ante, at 9, n. 11 (observing that “‘[c]omponent’ is commonly defined as ‘aconstituent part,’ ‘element,’ or ‘ingredient’”). And unlike a blueprint that merely instructs a user how to do some-thing, software actually causes infringing conduct to occur.It is more like a roller that causes a player piano to pro-duce sound than sheet music that tells a pianist what todo. Moreover, it is surely not “a staple article or commod-ity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use” as that term is used in §271(f)(2). On the contrary, its sole intended use is an infringing use.
External links
References